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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
neither waiver nor estoppel. Likewise, neither waiver nor estop-
pel is available to an insured in bad faith.
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
Distribution of a Limited Insurance Fund to
Multiple Claimants
The problem of how to distribute a fund,, insufficient to
satisfy all claims, is encountered in various areas of the law,
such as in bankruptcy and in the administration of insolvent
successions. In these instances, the courts with the aid of legis-
lation have developed rather well-settled methods of distribu-
tion. However, procedures for distributing limited insurance
funds among multiple claimants are not so clearcut, and ex-
cept in rare instances where there is legislation on the matter'
the insurer distributes the fund subject to certain obligations
to the insured. The purpose of this Comment is to examine
the problems involved where there are multiple claims to limited
insurance funds, to review current methods of distribution, and
to discuss suggested alternative procedures. This discussion con-
templates an insurance fund to be distributed according to the
terms of the Standard Automobile Liability Policy, 2 although
much of the discussion is pertinent to other types of casualty
insurance policies.
The Settlement Process
Single claims to the insurance fund. Most of the leading
cases which consider the legal relations between insurer, insured,
1. A New York statute makes provision for allocating proceeds of insurance
policies held by certain carriers of passengers for hire. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAW § 17(1). This provision states that the policy must require payment of
specified limits "to be apportioned ratably among the judgment creditors accord-
ing to the amount of their respective judgments." It has been held that the proper
form of remedy under this statute, when several persons have been killed or
injured as the result of a single accident and the wrongdoer is insolvent, is an
inequitable proceeding by a judgment creditor suing in his own behalf and in be-
half of others similarly situated,to administer the proceeds of the policy as a fund
created by statute for ratable protection. Bleimeyer v. Public Serv. Mut. Cas.
Ins. Corp., 250 N.Y. 264, 165 N.E. 286 (1929).
2. STANDARD AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY, NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY
UNDERWRITERS AND MUTUAL INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, BASIC AUTOMOBILE
AND PHYSICAL DAMAGE FORM (1955). See Faude, The 1955 Revisions of the
Standard Automobile Policy: Coverage: Insuring Agreements and Exclusions, in




and claimant in the settlement situation, have arisen out of
single claims to the insurance fund. However, there is no indica-
tion from the jurisprudence that these legal relations are altered
by the presence of more than one claimant, although as borne
out in subsequent discussion, the obligations of the insurer be-
come more complex where multiple claims are involved.
As a general rule, claims against tortfeasors holding liability
insurance are settled without litigation.3 To this end, most
policies contain a clause allowing the insurer to negotiate settle-
ments as he deems expedient.4 Although typical policy language
would indicate that the insurer has a privilege to settle as it
sees fit, the courts have implied a duty, requiring the carrier to
make or accept reasonable settlement offers within the policy
limitations.5 The duty to settle is recognized in most jurisdic-
tions, but there is disagreement as to what constitutes a breach
of that duty. The majority view is that the duty to settle is
breached when the insurer intentionally disregards the interests
of the insured, such as when he refuses to settle knowing that
there is a less than equal chance that a verdict would make the
insured liable in excess of the policy limits.6 In a minority of
jurisdictions, the duty to settle is breached merely when the
insurer is negligent in handling a claim,7 such as when he fails
3. "It is a matter of common knowledge that the great majority of claims
arising under these policies are settled. The percentage of litigated cases is small.
Settlement is the rule and contest the exception." Douglas v. United States Fidel-
ity and Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 378, 127 Atl. 708, 712 (1924) (dictum).
4. See A.PPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LiABILITY INsURANcE 84 (1938).
5. Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949)
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Idemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Com. App. 1929).
6. Attleboro Manufacturing Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917) ; National Mutual Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203
Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948). See also Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co.,
89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1960), aff'd, 186 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1951) (disre-
garding or limiting settlement offers because of claimant's race, creed, or color) ;
Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952) (demonstrating
unwillingness to effect a settlement and showing lack of diligence in investigating
a claim) ; Royal Transit v. Central Surety & Insurance Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (disregarding suggestions of a field
adjuster and local trial counsel and taking arbitrary, capricious, reckless, and in-
different action towards the insured's interest) ; Southern Fire and Casualty Co.
v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952) (advising the insured to
transfer his property to avoid liens).
7. Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.. 81 N.H. 371, 373, 127
Atl. 708, 710 (1924) : "Exclusive authority to act does not necessarily mean the
right to act arbitrarily .... So far as the obligation to use care is concerned ...
that obligation is ordinarily imposed by law upon all who undertake a service ....
The result . . .of [an obligation to defend] . . . is not to leave the promisor free
to act as though he had made no promise. The insurer has a duty to the insured
at least equal to that which he owes himself. To prefer himself to the insured in
refusing a settlement in a negligent manner is a breach of his duty as an agent
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to investigate a suit pending against his insured or when he
fails to investigate a claimant's injuries." As a remedy, the
insurer is ordinarily required to pay the full amount of any
judgment rendered against the policyholder as a result of the
company's breach of the duty to settle, even if that amount ex-
ceeds the policy maximum.9
With full knowledge of the consequences of breaching the
duty to settle, the insurer is usually eager to reach a settlement
agreement with each party asserting a valid and reasonable
claim within the policy limits. However, refusal to settle because
of justifiable doubt as to the validity or reasonableness of a
given claim does not constitute breach of the duty to settle.
Where such doubt exists (and in the absence of a direct action
statute) the insurer may refuse to pay until the claimant has
obtained judgment against the insured. This privilege exists
under the "no action" clause of the Standard Policy which pro-
vides, in part:
"No action shall lie against the company . . . until the
amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment against the insured
after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the
claimant and the company."
However, the "no action" clause is forbidden in policies issued
in Louisiana and is statutorily abrogated in insurance contracts
issued or delivered outside the state, provided that the injury
in question takes place and the case is tried in Louisiana.'0 Under
the Louisiana Direct Action Statute," the injured party may
for settlement." See G. A. Stowers v. American Idemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. Com. App. 1929); APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 89
(1938). Appleman has stoutly contested the ability of a jury to decide whether or
not an insurer has handled a claim in a negligent manner. Appleman, Duty of
Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J.100, 109 (1938). However,
the courts seem to allow some latitude for the uncertainties involved. American
Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 1951) : "Lawyers represent-
ing liability insurers of motor users are not required to be prophets who can
accurately foretell the results of litigation in personal injury cases arising out of
automobile accidents nor does a mere mistake of judgment by these lawyers impose
liability on the insurers beyond the policy limits of coverage."
8. Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1950),
aff'd per curiam, 186 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1951).
9. Ibid.
10. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of that portion of the statute which legislatively abrogates "no
action" clauses in policies issued or delivered out of state, provided the accident
occurs in Louisiana. Watson v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1955), rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 921 (1955).
11. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958, No.
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proceed directly against the tortfeasor's insurer without first
obtaining judgment against the insured.12
Settlement of Multiple Claims
If only two claims are involved, the interests of the claimants
and the insured do not ordinarily conflict since the maximum
per-person coverage is usually one-half the insurer's maximum
liability - thus the most either claimant could recover under a
$5,000/10,000 policy would be $5,000. However, where there are
three or more claimants and their aggregate demands exceed the
policy maximum, a claimant's interest may conflict both with the
interests of the insured and with those of his co-claimants. Sup-
pose that A, B, and C are injured in a traffic mishap due to the
insured's negligence. The insured holds a Standard Automobile
Liability Policy under which the insurer can be required to pay
up to $5,000 to each person injured but its total liability per
accident cannot exceed $10,000. A offers to settle for $4,000;
B and C offer to settle for $5,000 each. Upon investigation, the
company determines that if these claims were pursued to judg-
ments, it is likely that A would recover $7,500; B, $12,500; and
C, $15,000. The convenient solution would be to negotiate a
comprehensive settlement with all three, bringing their combined
demands within the policy maximum. However, if this cannot
be accomplished, the insurer must refuse to settle with at least
one of them. In the single claims cases, the courts apparently
recognize that part of the insurer's duty to settle is to minimize
the insured's liability in excess of the policy,13 and it would seem
that the same would hold true in the settlement of multiple
claims. Thus although all three claims are reasonable, it is
arguable that the insurer would be required to settle with B and
C, whose judgments would likely be the largest, forcing A, who
offered to settle for less than either, to obtain judgment against
the policyholder after the proceeds have been exhausted. Since
this position may be most undesirable from A's point of view,
125. For an excellent discussion of the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, see
Comment, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 243 (1961).
12. In a direct action, the plaintiff must prove that the insured would have
been liable, if sued, and that if liable the insurer would have been obligated to pay.
In its defense, the insurer may urge any defense the insured could have used
had the action been brought against the latter, except those which are considered
"personal" to the insured. See Comment, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 243 (1961).
13. Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying
Illinois law); Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d
57 (1947) ; G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d
544 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
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especially if the insured is insolvent, he may search about for
ways to protect what he considers to be his rightful share of the
policy proceeds.
Protecting a Claimant's Interest
In earlier cases, the view prevailed that the claimant had no
enforceable interest in the insurance fund. 14 The liability policy
was construed strictly as a contract of indemnification between
the insurer and insured, and until the policyholder had actually
paid a judgment against him, no liability would arise under the
contract." Thus, where the insured was insolvent or otherwise
unable to pay, a claimant with judgment against the insured was
disabled from collecting the policy proceeds. This result is now
considered contrary to public policy and most states require that
liability policies carry a clause to the effect that insolvency or
bankruptcy of the insured shall not bar an action directly against
the carrier.', Except in jurisdictions having direct action
statutes, this right of action is restricted by the "no action"
clause to claimants who either have obtained judgment against
the insured or who have entered into a binding settlement agree-
ment.
In the relatively few cases in point, the courts have preserved
the insurer's freedom to distribute the fund as he deems ex-
pedient so long as the distribution is consonant with the best
interests of the insured." In instances where the carrier refuses
to settle until judgment is secured against the insured, the courts
have held that the proceeds are to be distributed on a "first
come, first served" basis, to the diligent claimants with the
earliest judgments.' This system of distribution is perhaps satis-
factory both to the company and to the policyholder, but it may
have objectionable features from the claimant's viewpoint.
Though a claimant asserts a valid and reasonable claim, a carrier
14. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 173 S.W. 307 (1915);
RICHARDS, INSURANCE 901-02, § 503 (4th ed. 1932); VANCE, INSURANCE 999-
1000, § 196 (3d ed. 1951).
15. 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 485 (1941).
16. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958, No.
125. See Comment, 9 ORE. L. REV. 57 (1930) ; Notes, 46 HAuRv. L. REV. 1325
(1933), 15 IOWA L. REV. 73 (1930).
17. Bartlett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 Atl. 180 (1933), 43
YALE L.J. 136 (1934) ; Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d 823 (1957) ;
Bruyette v. Sandini, 291 Mass. 373, 197 N.E. 29 (1935), 49 HARV. L. REV. 658
(1936) ; Turk v. Goldberg, 91 N.J. Eq. 283, 109 Atl. 732 (Ch. 1920).
18. Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957) (applying Oklahoma
law) ; Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d 823 (1957); Bruyette V.
Sandini, 291 Mass. 373, 197 N.E. 29 (1935), 49 BARv. L. REV. 658 (1936).
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may refuse to settle with him in order to use the proceeds in
settling with other claimants who would likely obtain higher
judgments against the insured. Or, the proceeds may be ex-
hausted in payment to claimants who have rushed their claims
to judgment. In order to protect their interests in the insurance
proceeds, claimants have sought to assert rights in the fund in
addition to those granted under the insolvency and "no action"
clauses.
It has been argued, generally, that each claimant should have
a right in the insurance fund only in the proportion that his
claim bears to the aggregate of all claims. In support of this
contention, it has been urged that multiple claimants are in the
nature of multiple lien creditors and that, according to the prin-
ciples of suretyship, creditors of the same rank should share
ratably in the limited fund.19 This argument has been cast in
various procedural forms. Some claimants have sought to enjoin
settlements between the insurer and co-claimants which would
exhaust the insurance proceeds. 20 Others have pursued their
claims to judgment and then sought to overturn prior settle-
ments on the theory that a judgment creditor of the insured has
a higher priority to the fund than a claimant without judg-
ment.21 To date, all such actions have failed and no court has
permitted a claimant, with or without judgment against the
insured, to prevent or overturn a settlement on any theory
militating against the insurer's freedom to settle under the terms
of the policy. Although again unsuccessfully, some claimants
have argued that the insurer has a duty to each claimant to
19. Bruyette v. Sandini, 291 Mass. 373, 197 N.E. 29 (1935), 49 HARV. L.
REv. 658 (1936). Contra, Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957)
Gallo v. Foley, 296 Mass. 306, 5 N.E.2d 425 (1936).
20. Turk v. Goldberg, 91 N.J. Eq. 283, 285, 109 AtI. 732, 733 (Ch. 1920)
"To hold that the policy is for the benefit of all injured persons pro-rata would
make it necessary for the insurance company to ascertain, before it could safely
pay any one, how many persons might have claims thereon. . and what the
total amount of the judgments which might be presented would be." See also
Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d 823 (1957) ; Piscietta v. Preston, 170
Misc. 376, 10 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
21. Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d 823 (1957); O'Donnell v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 50 11.1. 275, 146 Atl. 770 (1929). In one such suit a
policyholder's survivor claimed a superior right to the proceeds because she was
a lbeneficiary of the policy with rights to the proceeds fixed at the moment of
death which could not be impinged upon by subsequent settlements with injured
parties. The court was not persuaded, holding that all claimants' rights are
fixed at the moment the insured becomes liable. Alford v. Textile Insurance Co.,
248 N.C. 224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958). In another case, an injured party was unsuc-
cessful in overturning a prior settlement which the carrier had made with the
insured, indemnifying the latter for his property damages as a result of the
accident and thereby exhausting the policy proceeds. Connecticut Wholesale
Drug Co. v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 186 Atl. 551 (Conn. Ct. Err. 1936).
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refrain from settling disproportionately with other claimants
and that disproportionate settlement should give rise to an
action, by the prejudiced claimant, against the company for
damages.2 2 Possibly a claimant could bring an action on behalf of
himself and all other claimants similarly situated; but it is per-
haps unlikely that he would be so generous since, under the
present jurisprudence, if he obtains the first judgment he is
entitled to full satisfaction and can be required to share with
no one.
Intervention in Actions Instituted by Other Claimants
Against the Insurer
In actions against an insurer, brought by judgment creditors
of the insured, or by claimants without judgments under a direct
action statute, the court is called upon to decide to whom the
fund is to be distributed. Once that judgment becomes definitive,
the rights of the parties to the insurance fund become fixed.
Suppose that one of several claimants discovers that his co-claim-
ants have already instituted action against the insurer and he
desires to intervene lest they obtain first judgment against the
insurer and the proceeds be exhausted before he can obtain a
separate judgment. Though there are no reported cases in point,
it is suggested that both the Federal and Louisiana courts would
probably approve his application to intervene.
Under the Federal Rules, 23 a party has a right to intervene
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribu-
tion of property subject to the disposition of the court. In order
successfully to assert "intervention of right," he must have an
interest in the property such as a claim of ownership or a legal
or equitable lien.24 Whether or not such a right exists is, of
course, a matter of substantive law in the state of forum. In
most states it has not been decided whether the judgment credi-
tor of the insured has a property right or lien in the insurance
fund; but where the issue has been considered, the decisions
are mixed.2 5 Though the courts of Louisiana have not ruled on
22. Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 23 A.2d 325, 326 (N.H. 1941):
"[T]he duty of an insurance company to protect its insured against liability
cannot consistently be extended to include protection to the one who is seeking to
hold the insured liable." See also Bartlett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Conn. 147,
167 Atl. 180 (1933) ; Bennett v. Conrady, 180 Kan. 485, 305 P.2d 823 (1957).
23. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (3).
24. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.09[2] and cases cited therein (1960).
25. Bruyette v. Sandini, 291 Mass. 373, 197 N.E. 29 (1935) (the court
viewed the claimant without judgment against the insured as one in the nature
220 [Vol. XXII
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the point, it is suggested that since the legislature has declared
that "all liability policies . . . are executed for the benefit of
all injured persons,' 2 a court might be persuaded to recognize
a property right in the fund on the part of an injured claimant.
It is perhaps unlikely that Louisiana courts would recognize a
lien since, though a debtor's property is the common pledge of
his creditors,27 privilege can be claimed only for those debts to
which it is expressly granted by positive legislation 28 - none has
been granted in favor of an insurance claimant.
Even if no property right is recognized, the federal courts
might permit a claimant to intervene under Rule 24 (b) (2) :
"Where an applicant's claim.. .and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common .... In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the right
of the original parties."-'
It is suggested that a court faced with an application for per-
missive intervention could not avoid re-evaluating the "first
come, first served" rule. If it permits the intervention, then the
original plaintiff's right to initial satisfaction from the insur-
ance fund might be impinged upon if he is required to share
ratably with the intervenor. On the other hand, if the court re-
fuses intervention, it would necessarily perpetuate the first
come, first served principle.
of a lienor but without any property rights in the fund). Contra, Burchfield V.
Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957) (applying Oklahoma law) ; Century
Indemnity Co. v. Kofsky, 115 Conn. 193, 161 Atl. 101 (1932) ; Gallo v. Foley,
296 Mass. 306, 5 N.E.2d 425 (1936).
In the Burchfield case, ten persons pressed claims against a $5,000/$10,000
liability policy. Seven had secured judgment against the policyholder. Before any
had obtained judgment against his insurer, the insurer impleaded all claimants in
an interpleader proceeding. The court denied the claims of parties without
judgments since Oklahoma law recognized no property right or lien status on
the part of claimants without judgments against the insured. The court distributed
the fund pro rata among the seven judgment creditors, rejecting the argument
that the creditor who first obtained judgment against the insured should have
a preference in dictum (id. at 242) the court stated that "if the judgment credi-
tor last in point of time of entry of his judgment had filed the first suit aganst the
insurance company and obtained a prior judgment against it, he would no doubt
be entitled to collect his judgment without regard to the other common creditors
who had not instituted suit against the insurance company." This would seem to
indicate that Oklahoma law would not recognize a property right in the fund
even on the part of a judgment creditor of the insured who, by virtue of the "no
action clause, has an enforceable right in the proceeds!
26. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts 1958, No.
125.
27. LA. CVIL CODE art. 3183 (1870).
28. Id. art. 3185.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
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If a claimant sought to intervene in a prior instituted direct
action in a Louisiana court, his right to intervene would be
governed by Article 1091 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where-
in it is provided that:
".... a third person having an interest therein may inter-
vene in a pending action to enforce a right related to or con-
nected with the object of the pending action against one or
more of the parties thereto by ... joining with plaintiff in
demanding the same or similar relief against the defend-
ant.", 0
The redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure considered the con-
cepts of "intervention of right" and "permissive intervention"
of Federal Rule 24 to be unsuitable for implementing Louisiana
substantive law and the test of "question of law or fact in com-
mon" of the permissive intervention too narrow and inflexible.3 1
However, no attempt was made to define what constitutes an
"interest in enforcing a right related to or connected with the
object of the pending action"; moreover, there has been no ade-
quate definition in the jurisprudence.8 2 It is to be noted, how-
ever, that under a similar provision of the now superseded Code
of Practice,33 it was held that a privileged creditor had sufficient
"interest" to intervene in an action by another privileged cred-
itor in an action against a common debtor,3 4 but that an ordinary
creditor lacked sufficient interest to intervene in an action
against the debtor by another ordinary creditor.85 It is suggest-
ed, however, that the breadth of Article 1091, coupled with the
statutory recognition that the principal purpose of liability in-
surance is to provide a fund for the injured parties, might well
lead courts to permit intervention by a co-claimant in a direct
action against an insurer. To favor the most diligent claimant
by refusing the intervention would seem contrary to articulate
legislative policy.
Interpleader Proceedings Initiated by the Insurer
It is perhaps not an uncommon practice in Louisiana for an
insurer, unable to secure a comprehensive settlement with all
30. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PRocEDuRE art. 1091 (1960).
31. Id. comment (b).
32. Ibid.
33. LA. CODE OF PRACTicE art. 390 (1870).
34. H. B. Clafin Co. v. Feibleman, 44 La. Ann. 518, 10 So. 862 (1892).
35. Lincoln v. New Orleans Exp. Co., 45 La. Ann. 729, 12 So. 937 (1893).
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parties, to implead multiple claimants in a concursus (inter-
pleader) proceeding when it is likely that their combined judg-
ments would exceed the policy maximum.3 6 In all reported pro-
ceedings of this type, the courts have distributed the proceeds
pro rata among the claimants. Though insurers have used the
interpleader proceeding to distribute policy proceeds of the pol-
icy among judgment creditors of the insured,3 7 it is only recently
that a federal court has approved its use where the tort claims
were yet unliquidated. 38
Considerations of Public Policy
Thus far, the courts have refused to implement pro rata dis-
tribution at the instance of a claimant. It is suggested, however,
that this jurisprudence may be a bit stale in the light of modern
thinking regarding the purposes of liability insurance. It is
noteworthy that the cases, which forthrightly support the in-
surer's privilege to distribute the proceeds disproportionately,
are few in number and most are at least thirty years oldY9 In
the meanwhile, one finds numerous authorities becoming com-
mitted to the proposition that the primary purpose of liability
insurance is to provide a fund for the injured parties and to
spread the risks of liability among the motoring public- that
the social purpose of liability insurance is no longer to protect
individual policyholders from financial disaster.40 If the courts
also are committed to this notion, then perhaps the path of logic
would lead to recognition of a claimant's right to protect a pro
rata share of the policy proceeds before they are dissipated
among co-claimants. Informal conversations with insurance
36. Poirrier v. Audubon Insurance Co., 120 So.2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ;
Futrell v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 79 So.2d 903 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) : In
the former case, ten persons asserted claims against a $5,000/$10,000 policy. Total
judgments were slightly less than $100,000.
37. E.g., Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957).
38. Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960). The case is extraordinarily well reasoned and contains an exhaustive dis-
cussion of authorities. The court held that the jury would be allowed to decide the
issues of liability and damages and reserved to itself the task of apportioning
the policy proceeds. The text writers have long insisted that such is contemplated
under the Federal Rules, Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936,
49 YALE L.J. 377, 419-21 (1940) ; Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936:
1!, 45 YALE L.J. 1161-67 (1936).
39. See note 17 supra.
40. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insur-
ance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Note, Legislative Efforts To Make Insurance
G-uarantee the Payment of Tort Claims, 46 HABV. L. REv. 1325 (1933). The shift
from indemnity thinking to a concept of liability perhiips began with protection of
the injured parties' rights to the proceeds against insolvency or bankruptcy of
the insured. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
1961] 223.
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counsel indicate that the insurance industry is fearful of just
such an eventuality and that most companies go to some lengths
to distribute the fund as nearly as possible on a pro rata basis.
One insurance attorney has suggested that the only reason a few
recent decisions still support the insurer's freedom to distribute
the proceeds is that the companies make a strenuous effort not
to abuse this privilege.41
The Tentative Allocation Order Plan
Professor Robert Keeton has suggested a method of allowing
claimants, insurers, and policyholders to enforce pro rata dis-
tribution. 42 He proposes that in multiple claims situations, the
parties be entitled to an interlocutory order of court tentatively
allocating the policy proceeds to each claimant based upon an
"estimate of the probable results of trial" and authorizing the
company to settle individually with each claimant up to the
amount tentatively allocated as his pro rata share. The alloca-
tion would be on a percentage basis, rather than a cash figure,
so as to conceal a judicial inkling as to what the claim would be
worth if reduced to judgment. Professor Keeton urges that al-
lowing all parties to obtain an allocation order would work not
only to the claimant's advantage in preserving his pro rata
share, but also to the advantage of the insurer in defeating ex-
orbitant demands. Further, it would reduce competition among
claimants leading to inflated demands and would free the com-
pany from the risk of liability to the insured for disproportion-
ate commitment of the proceeds. The author admits at least two
principal objections to his plan - it is inconsistent with the "no
action" clause in allowing the claimant to enforce rights in the
policy before obtaining judgment, and there is a likelihood that
the plan could increase litigation. He suggests, however, that the
availability of the allocation order should place the parties at
interest in the position of trying to reach a comprehensive set-
tlement before going to court. In the face of these objections,
Professor Keeton suggests that this plan should ultimately serve
to strengthen the settlement process by giving each party to the
settlement a weapon of judicial allocation unless all are fair and
reasonable in their demands. If, however, such a system would
41. Fisher, Multiple Claim8 Under the Automobile Liability Policy, 19
INS. COUNSEL J. 419 (1952).
42. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance OlaimaS, 70 HADv.
L. Rcv. 27, 46-50 (1956).
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greatly increase litigation, then the remedy would not be worth
the treatment.
Conclusions
In the reported cases, the courts have protected the insurer's
freedom to distribute the policy proceeds among multiple claim-
ants and have refused to permit claimants to protect a pro rata
share. Such freedom, however, could be easily abused. The in-
surer could offer a claimant the choice of accepting what the
company has to offer, or risk exhaustion of the proceeds in set-
tlements with other claimants who will accept the company's
terms. If such a practice were widespread, or if disproportion-
ate distribution were common, perhaps courts or legislatures
should provide claimants with enforceable rights in the proceeds.
However, it is submitted that there is insufficient evidence to
indicate that these practices are commonplace. There are very
few reported cases in which a claimant contests a disproportion-
ate settlement. Further, there are indications that carriers go
to some lengths to distribute the proceeds pro rata, lest claim-
ants be permitted to preserve their shares in court. Moreover,
there is a lack of agitation from text writers43 or plaintiffs' at-
torneys to change the present system of free distribution by the
insurer. If the freedom which the companies now enjoy is not
being abused, then allowing claimants enforceable interests in
the proceeds would entitle them to nothing more than they now
receive. Allowing enforceable proration under any plan thus far
suggested would serve needlessly to increase litigation in courts
whose dockets are already overcrowded.
Gerald LeVan
The Role of Subrogation by Operation of Law
and Related Problems in the Insurance Field
Introduction
Subrogation accompanies payment. Payment discharges the
obligation, but the fiction of subrogation operates to continue
the existence of the rights, privileges, and powers of the former
43. Professor Keeton does not suggest commonplace abuse by the insurance
companies. He only suggests that the company's duty to the insured and its
obligations to the claimant be consistent. Id. at 28.
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